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Remedial Rights by Contract
In our society individuals are granted the right to have their private
contracts enforced by public authorities. The parties to a contract agree
on a particular course of performance, and the courts then fix the
proper remedy should one of the parties fail to perform.' This pattern
may be altered when the parties define some aspect of the remedy them-
selves; their contract may provide for devices such as cognovit notes,2
warranty disclaimers 3 liquidated damage clauses,4 and damage limita-
tions.' The element common to these various devices is that one party
agrees to forgo some remedy that he might othenvise be granted in a
case of breach. These devices thus represent the waiver, or sale, of
remedial rights by means of a contractual agreement. 6
1. To quote Karl Llewellyn, "[i]t is the parties who make agreements, but it is the law
which determines the legal consequences of agreements." National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, Report on a Revised Uniform Sales Act, § 51-A, Com-
ment A(2)(a) (2d draft 1941) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn's Draft]. This is an early
version of what ultimately became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
2. E.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 176 (1972) (agreement on cognovit
provision waives right to notice and hearing).
3. E.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir.
1974) (agreement to disclaimer of all warranties waives right to sue for damages when
product malfunctions).
4. E.g., Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Scott, 311 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1976) (invocation of liquidated damage clause waives right
to any further remedies).
5. E.g., County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308-
09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) (agree-
ment to limitation excluding consequential damages waives right to recover lost profits
resulting from malfunction of product). The U.C.C. uses the term "remedy limitation."
U.C.C. § 2-719. Since the term "remedy" has a more general meaning, specific limitations
on the kinds of damages that can be awarded will be referred to in this Note as "damage
limitations."
6. Contractual waivers should be distinguished from the various statutory provisions
that have been at issue in the much-noted line of Supreme Court cases involving seizures
of property without a prior hearing. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601, 601-03 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601-03 (1974); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 338-39
(1969). These cases involved prejudgment garnishments or repossessions, rather than
efforts to restructure the process by which a final disposition is achieved. More important,
the cases involved provisions that were established by the legislature and operated by
force of law. A waiver, on the other hand, being the intentional abandonment of a pre-
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The extent to which waivers of this sort should be permitted is a
problem that raises basic questions about the remedial rights involved
and about the relationship between private contracts and public law.
Courts have approached these questions by distinguishing between
those remedial rights granted by the Constitution and those secured by
statute or by common law. In the constitutional area, however, the
courts have failed to articulate a clear rationale for their decisions, and
in other contexts they have developed a separate rationale for assessing
the validity of each specific type of waiver. The cases express no con-
sistent principle for dealing with either constitutional or nonconstitu-
tional waivers, and no unified approach is apparent.
This Note attempts to provide such a unified approach for the area
of sales contracts.7 First, it surveys the various doctrines courts have
used to analyze the waiver of commercial and constitutional rights. It
then argues that there is a single principle that underlies these doc-
trines. This principle demands that whenever private parties attempt
to alter the judicial remedies that would normally be available for
breach of contract, they must provide the functional equivalent of the
omitted rights. If they waive the right to have a court establish the
damages for breach, they must provide for damages of an approxi-
mately equivalent nature in their own agreement; or, if one party
waives his right to judicial notice, a hearing, or any aspect of that hear-
ing, the functional equivalent of those procedural protections must be
provided in the personal interaction between the parties.
I. Existing Doctrines Governing Waiver of Remedial Rights
In deciding whether to enforce or cancel contractual clauses that
waive remedial rights, courts distinguish between constitutional and
commercial remedial rights. Constitutional protection for remedial
rights is derived from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, which require that the state provide each party
with notice, a hearing, and an impartial decisionmaker prior to making
a determination that affects property rights.8 Should one party ask a
existing right, requires a private agreement. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69-70
(1972) (right of seller to repossess goods established by law) with Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (right of seller to repossess
goods established by contract).
7. Sales contracts, as used in this Note, refer to transactions in goods covered by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-102; cf. id. § 2-105(l) (defining
"goods").
8. For the basic elements required by due process, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
266-71 (1970). See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (notice);
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court or other agent of the state to enforce a contract in which one of
these elements is waived, the other party may claim that such enforce-
ment would violate the due process clause.9
Most waivers of remedial rights in sales contracts do not result in
total elimination of notice and a hearing; instead, they usually alter
the nature and extent of any hearing that ultimately takes place. 10
Courts generally hold that waivers of this kind are purely commercial
matters, which do not impair any of the elements of due process. The
applicable rules, therefore, are derived from common law or statutory
provisions. 1
Despite the division of remedial waiver cases into these two cate-
gories-constitutional and commercial-and despite the different stan-
dards that each category involves, judicial decisions in these two groups
of cases do bear a resemblance to each other. In fact, the pattern of
decisions suggests that there exists an underlying dialogue between
these groups of cases, a dialogue that the language of the decisions only
partially articulates. Constitutional decisions are often based, in part,
on commercial law considerations, while commercial law decisions often
impose limitations on remedial waivers that resemble constitutional
requirements.
A. Contractual Waiver of Constitutional Rights
The question of when constitutional rights may be waived arises in
a variety of contexts, including search and seizure, free speech, and the
rights of defendants in criminal prosecutions. 2 Although the Supreme
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 165-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (hearing); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197-99 (1974) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (impartial decisionmaker).
9. Compare Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1950) (notifica-
tion by newspaper that is unlikely to be seen violates Fourteenth Amendment) with
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (actual notification
satisfies Fourteenth Amendment, despite waiver of official notice).
10. For example, a warranty disclaimer waives the right to a court hearing only on
the particular issue that the warranty would otherwise have covered. See note 3 supra
& pp. 1065-66 infra. In constrast, the constitutional cases involve total waiver of notice or
a hearing. See pp. 1060-63 infra.
11. Generally, due process claims are not even raised in commercial waiver cases. See
note 70 infra (use of unconscionability as general standard for voiding commercial law
waivers). Even where cognovit notes, involving the total waiver of notice and hearing,
were involved, the issue was typically litigated in commercial law terms until recent years.
See, e.g., Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953) (inconspicuous cognovit
voided without reference to due process); Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 203 (1956)
(cognovit resulting in unreasonable liquidated damages voided without reference to due
process).
12. E.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 344-45 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (whether
acceptance of welfare waives Fourth Amendment right to refuse home visits by welfare
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Court has held that courts must "indulge every reasonable presump-
tion"'1 3 against the waiver of constitutional rights,14 it has failed to
articulate a general principle for such waivers. In particular, no stan-
dards have been established to govern the contractual waiver of the
due process rights of notice and a hearing. In D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co.,' 5 the Supreme Court found itself confronted with this
problem and explicitly refused to resolve it.16
Overmyer involved a cognovit note, the most extreme form of con-
tractual waiver of remedial rights.' 7 A cognovit is a contractual provi-
sion in which one party authorizes the other party to enter judgment
against him in any dispute that might arise; as such, it represents the
total waiver of both notice and a hearing. The typical cognovit is part
of a standard form contract and is associated with overreaching mer-
cantile practices against consumers.' 8 The cognovit in Overmyer, how-
ever, lacked these objectionable characteristics. It was the product of
extended negotiations between two large corporations and was de-
manded by Frick only after Overmyer became delinquent on its re-
quired payments. Moreover, the provision was carefully drawn up by
lawyers representing both corporations who had a full understanding
worker); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970) (whether guilty plea waives
right to raise coerced confession claim); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (whether acceptance of teaching position waives First Amendment right to criticize
school board).
13. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (request for directed verdict
does not waive right to trial).
14. See id.; Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 306-07 (1937)
(participation in administrative proceeding that ultimately reaches decision on certain
issues does not waive right to trial on those issues). Although these cases do not involve
contractual waivers, the principle they articulate has been applied to all types of civil law
waivers, including contractual ones. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972);
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188-89 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Commentary on Overmyer includes Note, Cognovit Revisited:
Due Process and Confession of Judgment, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 1045, 1064 (1973) (Court's
decision permits signature alone to support cognovit judgment if debtor has subsequent
opportunity to attack it); 51 N.C.L. REV. 554, 559 (1973) (strict criminal law standard
should be used for judging cognovits); 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 747 (1972) (Court's case-by-
case approach inadequate; all cognovits should be forbidden in consumer contracts); 25 U.
FLA. L. REV. 376, 380 (1973) (decision strikes balance between debtors and creditors).
16. 405 U.S. at 188 ("Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other
facts of other cases.")
17. See Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953) (cognovit most
extreme form of contractual waiver).
18. See generally Hobson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHm. L. REV. 111, 124 (1961) (cognovits usually part of
standard form contract); Note, Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considera-
tions, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1130 (1970) (state laws evidence strong public policy against
cognovits); Comment, Confessions of Judgment: The Due Process Defects, 43 TEmP. L.Q.
279, 286-87 (1970) (cognovits are contracts of adhesion, rarely understood or assented to
by consumers). These and other critical comments on cognovits were cited by the Over-
myer Court 405 U.S. at 177 n.4.
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of its implications."0 Presented with the choice of forbidding all cogno-
vits or finding a rationale that would permit them under certain cir-
cumstances, the Court sought refuge in Overmyer's unusual factual
situation. It stated that even if the stringent criminal law standard of a
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made" waiver of constitutional
rights were applicable, that standard had been met in the present case.2 0
This statement effectively dispensed with Overmyer but offers uncer-
tain guidance for other situations, as the Court itself conceded.2 1
The Court's unwillingness to adopt the criminal law standard prob-
ably rested on its belief that this standard would be too exacting in
commercial contexts. This objection might now appear less serious in
light of subsequent decisions diluting the criminal law standard.22 But
a serious problem remains: even in the carefully structured setting of
a criminal trial, the requirement that a waiver be voluntary, knowing,
and intelligently made has not been easy to apply.2 3 Its application
would be still more difficult in contractual situations, where the rele-
vant behavior involves only private parties and can assume a large
variety of forms. As Professor Gilmore, writing in another context, has
stated: "the presence or absence of 'knowledge' is a subjective question
of fact, difficult to prove. Unless there is an overwhelming policy argu-
ment in favor of using such a criterion, it is always wise to discard it
and to make decision turn on some easily determinable objective
event .... ",24
19. 405 U.S. at 186-87.
20. Id. at 185-86 (citations omitted):
Even if, for present purposes, we assume that the standard for waiver in a corpo-
rate-property-right case of this kind is the same standard applicable to waiver in a
criminal proceeding, that is, that it be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made,
•.. or "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,"
* . . and even if, as the Court has said in the civil area, "[w]e do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights," ... that standard was fully satisfied
here.
21. Id. at 188. Overmyer has been cited most frequently to support the proposition that
constitutional rights may in fact be waived. E.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. HUD, 414 F.
Supp. 877, 879 (D.D.C. 1976); Rogers v. Searle, 533 S.W.2d 433, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.), revrd
on other grounds, 544 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1976). But it has been generally recognized that
Overmyer fails to articulate a principle for determining the circumstances in which such
waivers will be permitted. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-95 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506-07 (1977) (failure to object to
admission of involuntary confession constitutes waiver, even if failure was not knowing
and deliberate); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 509-13 (1976) (failure to raise timely
objection to being tried in prison clothes constitutes waiver, even if objection is unknow-
ingly raised to wrong official). See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1068-86 (1977).
23. See Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional
Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 7-25 (1970).
24. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2, at 902 (1965).
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Accepting Overmyer's view that the criminal law standard for waiver
of constitutional rights need not be met in contractual situations, the
opinion appears to suggest only one additional method for dealing with
remedial waivers-the controlling rule must be determined by the facts
of the particular situation.2 At least one lower court has found this
suggestion to be "disquieting," 26 since facts alone, without an interpre-
tive principle, cannot yield a reasonably predictable judicial decision.
Yet what the Court may have meant is that the facts must be considered
in light of existing principles of commercial law: "where the contract
is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power,
and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other
legal consequences may ensue. '2 7 Indeed, those lower courts that have
subsequently addressed the contractual waiver of constitutional rights
agree that such commercial law principles must be considered in reach-
ing a decision. 28
Shortly after Overmyer, in Fuentes v. Shevin,2 9 the Supreme Court
repeated its suggestion that commercial law principles could be used
to analyze the waiver of constitutional rights. This did not clarify the
situation, however, since the Fuentes decision used these principles in
a somewhat different way. After articulating the due process rights of
those who purchase goods under a conditional sales contract,30 the
25. 405 U.S. at 187-88.
26. Law v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 66 F. Supp. 1233, 1240 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(court's disquiet based on uncertainty of standard).
27. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972).
28. United States v. Wynn, 528 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1976); Ricker v. United States, 417
F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Me. 1976); Law v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 366 F. Supp.
1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973). All these cases involved mortgage foreclosures by the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA). The FmHA is charged with making special loans "[tjo simplify
and improve credit services to farmers and promote farm ownership." Farmers Home
Administration Act of 1946, ch. 964, 60 Stat. 1062, preamble (current version codified in
scattered sections of 7, 12 & 31 U.S.C.). Pursuant to this objective, the FmHA generally
demands that the farmer who receives a loan waive his rights to notice and a hearing in
the event of a foreclosure proceeding. When faced with due process challenges to this
policy, all three courts cited Overmyer for the proposition that such waivers could be
constitutional, but that their validity depended on commercial law principles regarding
waivers. The Ricker court, having decided that the waiver was vulnerable because it did
not meet the criminal law standard, went on to find that it violated the due process
clause by virtue of being an adhesive term, 417 F. Supp. at 189. In the other two cases,
further fact finding was required on the issues of relative bargaining power of the parties
and clarity and comprehensibility of the waiver term, 528 F.2d at 1050; 866 F. Supp. at
1240.
29. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
30. Specifically, the court held that two state statutes authorizing the replevin of goods
purchased under conditional sales contracts violated the due process clause by denying
the purchaser a prior hearing before being deprived of property. Id. at 88-90. For the
distinction between such statutes and contractual waivers, see note 6 supra. Fuentes was
a 4-3 decision, written by Justice Stewart at the time when Justices Powell and Rehnquist
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Court rejected the contention that the purchasers in Fuentes had
waived these rights by virtue of certain provisions in the contracts.
Through Justice Stewart, the Court summarized Overmyer's holding
with evident approval and then distinguished Fuentes.31 In Fuentes,
the Court said, there was no equality of bargaining power, the waiver
was adhesive, and there was no showing that the purchasers were aware
of its effects; 3 2 in Overmyer, the opposite was true. But the dispositive
issue for the Fuentes Court was clarity: "a waiver of constitutional
rights," it stated, "must at the very least, be clear.""s The Court then
proceeded to analyze the alleged waiver in Fuentes in terms of its
clarity and found it fatally ambiguous.3 4
The Fuentes analysis is not unreasonable, but it is not the one sug-
gested by Overmyer. The Overmyer Court decided that a provision
met the stringent criminal law standard for waivers, since it had been
fully understood by the waiving party, and was thus immune from con-
stitutional attack. Fuentes ignored the entire issue of the waiving party's
degree of knowledge and of whether this knowledge was sufficient to
validate the waiver. Instead, it focused a critical eye on the waiver's
lack of clarity-an objective determination-and accordingly held the
waiver in automatic violation of the due process clause.
Thus the Court has developed no single, coherent principle for
determining the validity of contractual waivers of constitutional rights.
An elliptical reference to commercial law principles, as in Overmyer,
or an unexplained selection of a single, objective standard, as in
Fuentes, is not sufficient to define a constitutional requirement with
the requisite precision.35
were appointed but not yet sitting. Although apparently overruled once the court reached
full size, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); see id. at 629-36 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting), it was subsequently reaffirmed in North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975); see id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. 407 U.S. at 94-95.
32. Id. at 95.
33. Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 95-96.
35. For an attempt to define the circumstances in which a waiver term can be con-
sistent with due process, see Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: The Constitutionality of Texas'
Landlord Laws and Other Summary Procedures, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 215, 234-36 (1973)
(suggesting six indicia of valid waiver: buyer must be aware of waiver term, receive full
explanation of its effects, receive full explanation of creditor's remedies, have opportunity
to bargain, have waiver provision printed in large type, and have waiver provision printed
on separate sheet of paper in clear language). See also McCall, Due Process and Consumer
Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Repossession and Adhesion
Contract Issues, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 409-26 (1974) (suggesting that courts, in analyzing
waiver terms, recognize due process right to be free of adhesive contracts).
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B. Contractual Waiver of Commercial Rights
The contractual waiver of commercial rights is governed by statute
or by common law; for the area of sales, to which this Note is limited,
the basic statutory provision is Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.).30 Article 2 does not contain a general rule delineating
the permissible scope of waivers of remedial rights, 3 7 but it does dis-
tinguish between these rights and the purely private rights established
by the contractual agreement.3 8 Waivers of remedial rights are governed
by much more stringent standards. An official comment to one provi-
sion of Article 2 states that "it is of the very essence of a sales contract
that at least minimum adequate remedies be available." 30 This idea is
specifically adopted in the Article 2 provisions on warranty disclaimers,
liquidated damages, and damage limitations, and through the more
56. Though currently enacted in 49 states and the District of Columbia, the U.C.C. is
not completely uniform, since different states have varied its provisions somewhat in their
individual enactments. Some of these variations are relevant to the issues being considered
here. California, for example, has omitted § 2-302, the unconscionability provision, CAL.
U. COM. CODE § 2-302 (West 1964), and several other states have forbidden warranty dis-
claimers under § 2-316 where consumer goods are involved, e.g., MD. CoM. LAw CODE
ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 106, § 2-316A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976).
Nevertheless, all but a few provisions have been enacted in all but a few states, so that
the U.C.C. remains the basic source of sales law. See R. NORDSrtOM, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF SALEs 3, 6 (1970).
37. Section 1-102(3) provides that "[t]he effect of provisions of this Act may be varied
by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act." Since waivers of remedial rights
are in fact governed by other provisions, this section actually indicates the absence of an
Article 2 standard. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (establishing general standard forbidding waiver of
rules that "give rights to a debtor and impose duties on the secured party" and specific
exceptions to standard); Llewellyn's Draft, supra note 1, § 51-A(I-2) (providing general
rules for contractual limitation of remedies).
38. The waiver of purely private rights is governed by § 2-209(4), which adopts the
common law principle that such rights can be waived unwittingly, by a course of conduct.
Compare Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 403-05, 144 N.E.2d
387, 392, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 504-05 (1957) (party can waive right to assert anti-assignment
clause in contract by course of performance) with Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor
Lodge, Inc., 430 Pa. 550, 558-60, 244 A.2d 10, 16 (1968) (under U.C.C. party waived written
conditions by oral statements and course of conduct). Courts wil not permit remedial
rights, created by sources of law independent of the contract, to be waived in this way.
See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 250-51 (N.D. Ill.
1974), afj'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975) (U.C.C. disfavors remedy limita-
tions; clause requiring cancellation of supply contract as condition to suit for damages is
void, even between commercial parties). U.C.C. § 2-209 is evidently restricted to purely
private rights, created by the contractual agreement, since it is grouped with other provi-
sions on contract modification, and § 2-209(5) refers explicitly to "a waiver affecting an
executory portion of the contract."
39. U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1. See Llewellyn's Draft, supra note 1, § 51-A, Comment
A(2)(a) ("[A] minimum remedy at law is an inherent part of a contract's being legal ....
One aspect of the structure of the 'sale' or of the 'contract to sell' is some fair quantum of
remedy; and the character of that remedy is for the law to determine.")
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general standards of unconscionability and adhesion that are embodied
in the Code.40
1. Specific Provisions Governing Contractual Waivers
A person who buys a product for which the seller has disclaimed all
warranties has, in effect, waived his right to a judicial determination of
whether the product is defective. 41 U.C.C. section 2-316, which regulates
these disclaimers, requires that they be precisely worded, conspicuous,
and consistent with other terms in the contract.42 Some courts have
stated that these objective standards need not be met if the disclaimer
is understood by the buyer;4 3 others have held that they are absolute. 44
It is generally agreed, however, that the underlying purpose of the re-
quirements is to ensure that the buyer is fully aware that he is waiving
40. There are also various other devices for restructuring contractual remedies. See 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1970) (commercial arbitration); U.C.C. §§ 1-105 (forum selection clauses),
2-725 (clauses altering statute of limitations).
41. Some state laws and court decisions have forbidden such disclaimers in cases where
consumer goods are involved. See Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 456
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1972) (dictum) (manufacturer of
stock items may not disclaim warranty that item will function properly); MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975) (warranty disclaimers not permitted in consumer contracts);
MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 106, § 2-31GA (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976) (same). In other cases, dis-
claimers have been forbidden where the buyer suffers personal injury. E.g., Turner v.
International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 292, 336 A.2d 62, 70-71 (1975); Markle
v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 272-73, 509 P.2d 529, 535 (1973). Contra, Ford Motor
Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 692-94 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
42. Where a disclaimer's meaning is in conflict with an express warranty, the warranty
is generally held to be the controlling factor. E.g., Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F.
Supp. 682, 686-88 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 118-20, 534 P.2d 377,
386-87, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 690-91 (1975). This often applies even where the warranty is
oral and the disclaimer written. E.g., Ed Fine Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Knisley, 319 A.2d 33,
36-37 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Beshears v. S-H-S Motor Sales Corp., 433 S.W.2d 66, 71-72 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1968). Furthermore, the wording must be explicit and precise; any variation from
the statutory formula is considered fatal. E.g., S-C Indus., Inc. v. American Hydroponics
Sys., Inc., 468 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1972); Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585,
593 (8th Cir. 1964). Finally, the disclaimer must be conspicuous, as judged by various ob-
jective standards, such as size and style of type, position in the document, and availability
of the document to the buyer at the time of purchase. E.g., Greenspun v. American Ad-
hesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Dorman v. International Harvester Co.,
46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17-20, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521-23 (1975).
43. See Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 433-34, 196
S.E.2d 711, 718 (1973) (dictum) (conspicuousness not required where buyer is commercial
party with equal bargaining power who is actually aware of provision); Smith v. Sharpen-
steen, 521 P.2d 394, 395-96 (Okla. 1974) (conspicuousness not required where buyer testi-
fied that he read and understood entire contract).
44. See Mobile County Gas Dist. v. National Cash Register Co., 295 Ala. 188, 191, 326
So. 2d 105, 108 (1976) (conspicuousness is "an absolute requirement"); Rehurek v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 454-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 833 (Fla.
1972) (even if buyer testified that he read contract, he would not expect "that he was
waiving his right to insist that his new automobile perform properly").
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certain remedial rights. 45 In addition to these requirements, courts have
applied the criterion that the disclaimer be the result of a specific bar-
gain. Where there are open negotiations, a disclaimer will usually be
considered valid;46 in their absence, it will frequently be struck from
the contract. 47
A liquidated damage clause is one that fixes the specific amount that
one party must pay if he breaches the contract. It thus represents the
waiver, by both parties, of the right to have a court fix damages on the
basis of the actual harm resulting from the breach. U.C.C. section 2-718
regulates these clauses. Unlike section 2-316, it does not focus on the
objective characteristics of the clause or on the process that led to its
adoption; rather, section 2-718 is concerned with the reasonableness of
the result produced by the clause.4 8 Liquidated damages are permis-
45. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 109, 437 S.W.2d 459,
463 (1969) ("The very purpose of the statutory requirement is that any limitation be
brought to the attention of the buyer at the time the contract is made."); Woodruff v.
Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 46, 286 N.E.2d k88, 196-97
(1972) ("basic purpose" of U.C.C. is "to protect purchasers from surprise").
The recently enacted Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975), has the same goal. It establishes even
more detailed requirements regarding warranties of consumer goods and reiterates the
necessity of clear and conspicuous language. See id. §§ 2302-2303.
46. E.g., Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc., 39 Il1. App. 3d 48,
58, 349 N.E.2d 627, 636 (1976); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 308-09,
263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970).
47. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 193, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (1971) (referring to dis-
claimer of warranties printed on back of contract): "[The Court will reject a rule] which
elevates these bland and substantially meaningless terms and conditions above the in-
dividually and expressly negotiated terms and conditions, and gives them controlling
effect over specifically agreed upon items and conditions of the contract." See, e.g.,
Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989-90 (Colo. 1975) (even though disclaimer
is physically conspicuous, it cannot be given force in consumer contract unless "'clearly
brought to the attention of the buyer and agreed to by him' "); Mobile Hous., Inc. v.
Stone, 490 SAV.2d 611, 615 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (clause in contract disclaiming all war-
ranties and declaring that product is taken "as is" cannot prevail over display of sample
and individual negotiation based on display of sample).
Section 2-316(3) creates certain exceptions to the general rules established for w'arranty
disclaimers, e.g., permitting language like "as is" or "with all faults" to exclude all im-
plied warranties. Some courts have held that these exceptions are completely independent
of the other requirements, e.g., DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 155
(N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975) ("as is" language need not
be conspicuous). But the more common view is that the policy considerations underlying
the first two clauses of § 2-316 are applicable to all disclaimers. E.g., Fairchild Indus. v.
Maritime Air Serv., Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 183-90, 333 A.2d 313, 315-18 (1975) ("as is" term must
be conspicuous); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 396,
398-99, 268 A.2d 345, 352-54 (1970) ("It does not make sense to require conspicuous
language when a warranty is disclaimed by use of the words 'merchantability' or 'fitness'
and not when a term like 'as is' is used to accomplish the same result."); I IV. HAWELAND,
A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.19030301, at 77 (1964)
(same).
48. Cf. Leff, Unconscionabiliy and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485 (1967) (adopting terms "procedural" to describe formulation and characteristics
of contract and "substantihe" to describe contractual result).
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sible, it provides, only where they are "reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach .... A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty." 49 Because
the reasonableness of such damages will be construed by a court sub-
sequent to the breach, a liquidated damage clause is likely to be
deemed reasonable only if it produces a result similar to that which a
court would have reached in the absence of the clause.50 If the liqui-
dated damages are significantly different in amount from what the
court perceives the actual damages to be, the clause is likely to be
voided either as violative of section 2-718's rule against penalties or as
unconscionable. 51
A person who agrees to limit the types of damages for which he can
be compensated or the time period within which he can notify the
other party of a breach5 2 has waived a portion of his right to have a
court fix damages once it decides that a breach has occurred. These
limitations are thus similar to liquidated damage clauses. U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-719 forbids such limitations when an injury to the person is at
issue.53 In other situations, it explicitly permits them, but with two
49. U.C.C. § 2-718(l).
50. E.g., Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock 9- Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 689, 220
A.2d 263, 268 (1966) ('It is not the function of the court to determine by hindsight the
reasonableness of the expectation of the parties at the time the contract was made, but it
is the function of the court at the time of enforcement to do justice."); Equitable Lumber
Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 524, 344 N.E.2d 391, 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459,
465 (1976) (even if liquidated damage clause is correct estimate of anticipated harm at time
of contracting, it may be invalidated if it leads to unreasonably large result); cf. 5 COmIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1063 (1964) ("[I]n passing judgment upon the honesty and genuineness of
the pre-estimate made by the parties, the court cannot help but be influenced by its knowl-
edge of subsequent events.") Contra, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. City of Chicago, 350 F.2d
649, 651-52 (7th Cir. 1965) (relying on Lochner-era case, which analyzed problem entirely
in freedom of contract terms).
51. E.g., Hungerford Constr. Co. v. Florida Citrus Exposition, Inc., 410 F.2d 1229,
1232 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969) (liquidated damages void as penalty); Nu
Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 73 Misc. 2d 140, 143-44, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272-73
(Civ. Ct. 1973) (liquidated damages void as penalty, and could also be voided as un-
conscionable).
There are some cases holding that a liquidated damages clause will be accepted if it
fixes the recovery at a lower level than a court would ultimately establish. E.g., American
Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. McKoy-Helgerson Co.. 226 F. Supp. 842, 849 (W.D.S.C. 1963), afj'd per
curiaiu, 329 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1964); cf. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 1068 (1964) (parties may
limit liability by means of liquidated damage clauses). U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1, how-
ever, takes a contrary % Jew: "An unreasonably small amount [of liquidated damages] would
be subject to similar criticism [as an unreasonably large amount would be] and might be
stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses." Alternatively, low
liquidated damages could be analyzed under U.C.C. § 2-719 (remedy limitations) with
similar results.
52. Under U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a), the buyer is required to notify the seller of any breach
within a "reasonable time" in order to preserve his right to damages. The length of time
that will be deemed reasonable is often stated in the contract.
53. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
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restrictions: any limited remedy is void should it "fail of its essential
purpose,"54 and limits on consequential damages are void if uncon-
scionable. 5
Judicial decisions under section 2-719 indicate that damage limita-
tions will be given effect only if they yield results within the range of
results that courts themselves would be likely to reach. Since courts
frequently refuse to award consequential damages for breach of con-
tract,50 these damages, absent a determination of unconscionability, may
always be waived.57 On the other hand, courts view compensatory dam-
ages as an essential component of contract remedies. 5s Thus direct
damages may not be waived unless provision is made for an adequate
substitute such as repair, replacement, or a return of the purchase
price.50 Where repair is impossible or improperly performed, however,
the substitute remedy is held to fail of its essential purpose and will not
be enforced. 60 Similarly, if a substitute remedy produces a result signif-
icantly lower in value than the quantum of direct damages, the court
will not accept the waiver.01 Limitations on the time within which the
other party must be notified of breach may be given force if they leave
an adequate period for the breach to be discovered. 62 Where the defect
in the product is latent, and thus not discoverable within the prescribed
time, the limitation will be voided.0 3
54. Id. § 2-719(2).
55. Id. § 2-719(3).
56. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a); RESTATEIENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 330-331 (1932); 5 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1007 (1964).
57. E.g., Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1973); Cox Motor
Co. v. Castle, 402 S.V.2d 429, 431 (Ky. 1966).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-714(l), (2); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932): 5 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1002 (1964).
59. E.g., V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1971); Herbst-
man v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 12, 342 A.2d 181, 187 (1975).
60. E.g., Koehring Co. v..A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 890 (E.D. Mich. 1974) ("[fI]t would
not be equitable to allow the seller to refuse to perform the one remedy available to the
buyer and then be freed of any responsibility caused by this failure."); Adams v. J.I. Case
Co., 125 I1. App. 2d 388, 403-04, 261 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1970) (limitation of remedies to repair
creates implied warranty that repairs will be done properly, which survives clause ex-
cluding all implied warTanties).
61. E.g., Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 475-80, 540 P.2d
978, 985-88 (1975) (return of purchase price for steel plates may be inadequate where
plates have been used in large construction project); Reynolds v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.,
49 Mass. App. Dec. 97, 111 (1972) (correction of defective home improvement, without
compensation of consumer for resulting damage to home, is inadequate).
62. E.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 34
(S.D. Iowa 1973) (one-year limit contained in warranty for complaints regarding machinery
is enforceable); Willis v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 132 II. App. 2d 266, 271, 265 N.E.2d
899, 903 (1971) (seven-day limit for return of pigs is enforceable).
63. E.g., Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1217-18 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (15-day limit for complaints regarding industrial chemical
with possible latent defects is inadequate); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.,
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In addition to focusing on the results of damage limitations, courts
often scrutinize the objective characteristics of the limitations and the
process that led to inclusion of the limitations in the contract. For ex-
ample, many courts and commentators support the view that damage
limitations must be conspicuous in order to be enforced. 64 Other courts
have held that the absence of this requirement from section 2-719, in
contrast to its inclusion in section 2-316, demands that it not be
inferred.6 There is a greater degree of consensus that damage limita-
tions should be the result of a specific bargain. Limitations that are
negotiated between parties are generally given force,66 while those in-
cluded in a standard form contract or not mentioned during the transac-
tion are often voided by the courts for not having been the subject of
negotiations. 67
2. General Standards Governing Remedial Waivers
Courts also use the general doctrines of unconscionability and ad-
hesion to void remedial waivers. Unconscionability is now the more
important of the two and has been incorporated into the U.C.C. as
section 2-302. As used there, the term is undefined; however, the official
comment states "[t]he principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise."08
Although the provision itself gives no indication that it is intended
to apply specifically to waivers of remedial rights, the ten cases offered
by the comment as examples of unconscionable situations all relate to
23 N.Y.2d 398, 404-06, 244 N.E.2d 685, 688-89, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112-14 (1968) (10-day limit
for complaints regarding yarn fails of its essential purpose when latent defect is present);
cf. MCCLINTOCK ON EquITY § 105, at 281 (2d cd. 1948) ("Ordinarily, laches will not be
imputed to a plaintiff until the mistake is discovered.")
64. E.g., Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1972) (any inconspicuous language makes
remedy fail of its essential purpose); Avencll v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App.
2d 150, 155-56, 324 N.E.2d 583, 587 (1974) (inconspicuous remedy limitation cannot have
been part of actual agreement and would be void on that basis); R. NORDSTROM, supra
note 36, § 89, at 276 (1970); J. WmirrE & R. SuM. tERs, HANDBOOK Or TiE LAW UNDER TnE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-11 (1972).
65. E.g., Checker Taxi Co. v. Checker Motor Sales Corp., 376 F. Supp. 997, 999-1000 (D.
Mass. 1974); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 361. 362-63, 485 S.W.2d 183, 189-90 (1972).
66. E.g., Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1015
& n.2, 1018-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
67. E.g., Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 861, 454 S.W.2d
307, 309 (1970) (where agreement was reached by telephone and nothing was said about
limited remedy, subsequently discovered limitation of remedies printed on shipping tag
is void); Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 NAV.2d 462, 469-70 (N.D. 1974) (terms of remedy
limitation in booklet given buyer after he signed contract will not be given force without
proof of actual agreement to limitation).
68. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
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damage limitations and warranty disclaimers.6 9 In practice, courts have
tended to use unconscionability in analyzing such contractual provi-
sions and, in general, as a standard for the entire area of remedial
waivers.7 0 In contrast, they usually have refused to apply the concept
to other aspects of the contractual process.
71
69. Professor Leff's analysis of § 2-302 takes note of the Comment's emphasis on these
two types of remedial waivers, Leff, supra note 48 at 516-24. But the provision could not
be specifically directed to these matters, he argues, since each of them is covered by a
separate and much more explicit section of the Code. This would not negate the possibility,
however, that the concept was intended as a general standard for remedial waivers. Pro-
fessor Leff considers this possibility but rejects it as lacking both textual support and
relevant guidelines. Id. at 525. But see J. WHITE & R. SuMmERs, supra note 64, § 12-11,
at 387-88 (unconscionability provision is general policing guideline applicable to all clauses
in contract and all oppressive situations). The contention here is not that the use of un-
conscionability as a general guideline for remedial waivers is logical, but that such a read-
ing represents the interpretation courts have actually used.
70. The use of unconscionability as a standard is of course found in cases involving
consequential damage limitations, where unconscionability is explicitly incorporated in
the applicable U.C.C. provision, § 2-719(3). E.g., Luick v. Graybar Elec. Co. 473 F.2d 1360,
1363 (8th Cir. 1973) (requiring determination on unconscionability where limitation of
consequential damages is involved); McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 431-
34, 347 A.2d 253, 262 (1975) (voiding effort to exclude liability for both personal injury
and property damage as unconscionable, even as applied to property damage alone). But
unconscionability is also used as a standard for judging other types of remedial waivers,
such as limitations on direct damages, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d
279, 292 (Alaska 1976) (requiring determination on unconscionability where disclaimer
excluding direct damages is involved); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 10-11,
321 N.E.2d 897, 903-04 (1974) (voiding remedy limitation that fails of its essential purpose
as unconscionable), limitations on the time for notification of breach, e.g., Majors v. Kalo
Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 22 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (voiding time limitation as un-
conscionable where product has latent defect); Willis v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 132
IlL. App. 2d 266, 271, 265 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1971) (sustaining time limitation, but using
unconscionability as standard), liquidated damages, e.g., Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Pro-
cessing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 575-77 (8th Cir. 1975) (sustaining liquidated damage clause
that reasonably estimates risk, but using unconscionability as standard); A-Z Servicenter,
Inc. v. Segall, 334 Mass. 672, 676-77, 138 N.E.2d 266, 269 (1956) (voiding acceleration clause
as unconscionable when it results in disproportionate liquidated damages), and warranty
disclaimers, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 439-40, 208
S.E.2d 321, 324-25 (1974) (cancelling warranty disclaimer as unconscionable); Bill Stremmel
Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 418-19, 514 P.2d 654, 657 (1973) (sustain-
ing warranty disclaimer, but using unconscionability as standard).
71. For example, most courts have held that an excessive price is not a basis for a
finding of unconscionability. E.g., Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d
111, 113-14 (D.C. 1971); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 119, 405
P.2d 339, 342 (1965). But see American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H.
435, 438-39, 201 A.2d 886, 888-89 (1964) (excessive finance charges are unconscionable);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27-28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759-60 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd as to damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Finance
charges are a special case, however, since they create the one circumstance where the
"real" price of the item is established by the contract itself, and need not be determined
by the court. For a rare case in which a price term was held unconscionable in the
absence of excessive finance charges, see Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 86 Misc.
2d 1, 11, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
There is no compelling reason why the doctrine of unconscionability could not be ex-
tended to the price term and still be used as a specific criterion for judging remedial
waivers. But most courts have refused to make this extension and have used § 2-302 only
for waivers.
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The unconscionability standard relates both to the results of the
waiver and to the characteristics and formation of the waiver term. The
rule against unconscionable results appears to be the same as that ap-
plied to damage limitations and liquidated damage clauses: a court will
enforce the waiver only if the results it prescribes are similar to those
a court would reach. If the waiver leads to an economic loss outside
the scope of possible court decisions, it will be declared unconscion-
able.72 As far as the characteristics and formation of the waiver term are
concerned, courts again find contracts unconscionable for the same
reasons that they find contracts in violation of the specific U.C.C.
provisions. Thus, a court will disapprove an inconspicuous or incom-
prehensible waiver term as violating the unfair surprise component of
unconscionability.7 3 Similarly, a term that is not bargained for is often
deemed unconscionable under section 2-302's concept of oppression. '4
The second general doctrine that has been applied to remedial
waivers is the concept of adhesion. An adhesive term is one that is at-
tached to the main agreement, usually by means of a standard form
contract, and that negates the apparent meaning of other contractual
terms.75 In sales contracts, such terms are generally remedial waivers.7 6
The concept of adhesion is not specifically mentioned in the U.C.C.,
72. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(provision in contract resulting in repossession of all goods purchased when payments on
one item became overdue is unconscionable); Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 114
N.J. Super. 132, 139, 275 A.2d 154, 157-58 (1971) (repossession of vehicle along with
buyer's property contained in vehicle is unconscionable).
73. E.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 447-48, 240 A.2d 195,
198-99 (1968) (paragraph in fine print on back of order form and second paragraph in
manual that owner did not receive until after product was delivered were both uncon-
scionable attempts to disclaim warranties and limit remedies); Bogatz v. Case Catering
Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 1052, 1055-56, 383 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537-38 (Civ. Ct. 1976) (clause in small
print permitting retention of large deposit if contract is cancelled is unconscionable). This
rule does not apply in all cases if the inconspicuous provision conforms to trade usage.
If the court is satisfied that the underlying policy of the requirement is fulfilled by a
pre-existing understanding between commercial parties, it may permit the requirement
of conspicuousness to be eliminated. See Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d
256, 260-61, 544 P.2d 20, 23-24 (1975); note 106 infra.
74. E.g., Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544-45, 279 A.2d 640, 651-62 (1971) (unreason-
able terms imposed on purchaser who lacked meaningful choice are unconscionable);
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 950-52, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-92
(Civ. Ct. 1975) (contract imposed on party who does not speak English by high pressure
sales tactics is unconscionable).
75. For the leading commentary on the adhesion doctrine, see Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoiLuM. L. REV. 629 (1943). See
generally McCall, supra note 35; Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of
the Adhesion Contractor's Lawmaking, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 303 (1968); Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529
(1971).
76. See McCall, supra note 35, at 420 (courts do not void price terms, no matter how
objectionable, as adhesive).
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but it figured prominently in the early drafts of Article 217 and may
now be regarded as having been incorporated into the Code as a special
case of unconscionability.7T Adhesive terms are also voided by the
courts because they create the same dangers of unfair surprise or of
oppression. First, terms voided as adhesive are often inconspicuous; they
characteristically appear in the fine print provisions of standard form
contracts, where they go unnoticed by the unwary consumer.70 Second,
these terms, even when noted by the buyer, are usually not bargained
for but are part of a form that the seller is either unauthorized or un-
motivated to change.8 0 Considerations of convenience or necessity may
leave the buyer little choice, especially where one type of contract is
used throughout a given industry8l or where one company is exercising
a monopoly.8 2
II. A Unifying Principle for the Waiver of Remedial Rights
The constitutional and commercial law decisions regarding the con-
tractual waiver of remedial rights reflect converging lines of develop-
ment. In the area of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has re-
jected the idea of establishing obligatory rules for judging waivers of
constitutionally protected remedial rights in favor of more flexible
77. Llewellyn's Draft, supra note 1, § I-C. This section, entitled "Declaration of
Policy, and Procedure with Regard to Displacement of Single Provisions or Groups of
Provisions by Agreement," was specifically directed to situations in which "a number of
points purport to be covered in bloc by a transaction, as by a form-contract, or by
reference to a set of 'rules.'" Id. § l-C(2)(a). Thus the major purpose of this general
provision on contractual alterations of legal rights was to regulate standard form con-
tracts.
78. In cases governed by the U.C.C., the adhesion doctrine is most often incorporated
by specific reference to standard form contracts. The term "adhesion" has become in-
creasingly less common in recent cases, probably because of its absorption into the
Article 2 concept of unconscionability. See McCall, supra note 35, at 419 (adhesion
significantly relied on only by courts of California, which is only state not to adopt U.C.C.'s
unconscionability clause).
79. E.g., Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 497-98 (N.D.
1974); Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 199-200, 484 P.2d 405, 406 (1971).
80. E.g., Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 640, 171 N.W.2d 689, 693-
94 (1969) (exclusion of liability in telephone company contract for listing in directory);
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 497-98 (N.D. 1974)
(disclaimer in form contract prepared by large grain storage company).
81. The automobile industry is a leading example. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-90, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith,
99 N.J. Super. 441, 447, 240 A.2d 195, 198 (1968).
82. A familiar example is the telephone company. See, e.g., Allen v. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co. 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969). Contra, Wille v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976) (remedy limitation in telephone company's
standard form contract not void as adhesive, despite inequality of bargaining power be-
tween parties).
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standards tailored to the facts of the commercial situation.8 3 In com-
mercial law, most courts have adopted the view that there are issues
of public policy involved-issues too important to permit remedial
rights to be waived or sold unless a particular procedure is followed
and a certain level of fairness is assured. s4 The result is a dialogue be-
tween these two lines of cases, in which each has become infused with
the policies associated with the other. In constitutional adjudication,
courts have sought the flexibility and pragmatism of commercial law
in judging contractual waivers of remedial rights; in commercial law,
courts have tended to impose carefully structured requirements and
to employ intensive scrutiny in a manner characteristic of constitutional
adjudication.
The convergence of these two areas of law suggests that courts are
in fact relying on a single principle in both areas, a principle based on
notions of flexibility and fairness. The meaning of fairness is derived
from the due process clause, which requires notice and a hearing when-
ever binding determinations affecting property rights are made. This
standard of fairness is imposed as a requirement of law in constitutional
cases and, less rigidly, as a matter of public policy where commercial
remedial rights are involved.s5 The meaning of flexibility, in contrast,
stems from the idea of "freedom of contract": the agreement between
the parties should be honored whenever possible, and the rules regulat-
ing that agreement should encourage, not impede, the process of con-
tract formation.86
83. See pp. 1060-61 supra. See also Dunham, Due Process and Commercial Law, 1972
Sup. CT. REV. 135. Professor Dunham's article is a leading consideration of the possible
applications of the due process clause to the general field of commercial law. The author
analyzes possible rationales for holding various commercial law remedies subject to the
requirements of the due process clause, but ultimately rejects this approach on policy
grounds. He argues that a literal application of due process would cause excessive disrup-
tion of commercial law procedures. A similar argument is presented in White, The Aboli-
tion of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. R]v. 503, 506.
84. See pp. 1064-72 supra.
85. It has been established by an unbroken line of cases that due process considerations
must govern judicial determinations of property rights. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment pursuant to statute); Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18-19 (1928) (suit against out-of-state motorist); Windsor v. McVeigh,
93 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1876) (forfeiture of real property pursuant to statutory provision).
These cases establish a public policy of procedural fairness that can be applied to non-
constitutional cases as well. It is unquestioned that the enforcement of contracts is subject
to the demands of public policy. RESTATEMENT OF COxTRAcrs § 512 (1932) ("A bargain is
illegal ... if either its formation or its performance is ... opposed to public policy."); 6A
CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 1375 (1962) ("In thousands of cases contracts have been declared
to be illegal on the ground that they are contrary to public policy ....")
86. It should be noted that true freedom of contract demands flexibility, not leniency;
in fact, it may demand stringent oversight of the contractual process in many cases. As
Professor Kessler has noted, there are circumstances in which freedom of contract can be
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The combined demands of fairness and of contractual flexibility
suggest a principle of "functional equivalence." To preserve contractual
flexibility, parties should be permitted by mutual agreement to restruc-
ture the remedies for breach; to ensure the presence of fairness, parties
should be allowed to restructure these remedies only if the interaction
between the parties provides the functional equivalent of the rights
that have been eliminated.8 7 Two major implications emerge from the
principle of functional equivalence. Its fairness component suggests
that there is an irreducible minimum of remedial rights that must be
provided in any contractual situation. Its element of contractual flexi-
bility suggests that these rights need not be fixed in form; instead, they
can be provided in a variety of ways, which includes the private inter-
action between the parties to the contract.
A. Functional Equivalents for Constitutional Rights
Since notice and a hearing have been held to be essential components
of due process, their waiver in a sales contract can lead to a violation
of the due process clause 58 Courts will sustain such a waiver only if
the precise functions of these two procedures are provided by the
private interaction of the parties. In National Equipment Rental, Ltd.
v. Szukhent,0 a leading case on waiver of notice, the Court specifically
achieved only through flexible rules that are stringently applied. Kessler, supra note 75,
at 641-42. The principled way in which he uses the term enables it to accommodate the
basic elements of due process, just as a realistic use of due process can accommodate the
idea of freedom of contract. See id. at 641-42 (emphasis in original):
The prevailing dogma . . ., insisting that contract is only a set of operative facts,
helps to preserve the illusion that the "law" will protect the public against any abuse
of freedom of contract. This will not be the case so long as we fail to realize that
freedom of contract must mean different things for different types of contracts. Its
meaning must change with the social importance of the type of contract and with the
degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized contract.
This may be compared with the Supreme Court's statement on due process in Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961):
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures uni-
versally applicable to every imaginable situation ....
. . . [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.
87. In this way, the underlying purpose of the due process clause would be fulfilled
without holding the parties to the formal requirements of judicial process. Cf. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-84 (1975) (informal, minimal process fulfills Fourteenth Amend-
ment requirements in school disciplinary setting). For other leading statements on the
flexibility of due process requirements, see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-.35
(1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972).
88. See pp. 1058-59 supra.
89. 375 U.S. 311 (1964). The case involved a contractual clause in which the first party
appointed a person closely connected with the second party as the first party's agent for
service of process. The clause was designed to serve as a forum selection provision, but it
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held that prompt, unofficial transmittal of a summons could replace the
right to receive the summons directly from the court.90 A similar line
of analysis was used in Overmyer. The Court indicated that Overmyer
was aware of both the existence and significance of the cognovit note.
Thus Overmyer could expect judgment to be entered against it as soon
as it stopped making the payments required by the contract. 91
In a similar way, the waiver of a person's right to a hearing will be
deemed acceptable by the courts only if the functional equivalent of
the hearing is provided. The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly9"
held that the crucial components of a hearing are the right to make a
presentation of one's position, the right to confront adverse witnesses,
and the right to be represented by counsel. In a private interaction,
these rights are secured by bargaining, which gives each party the op-
portunity to present his position, to challenge the position of his ad-
versary, and to obtain the assistance of a lawyer or of some other skilled
negotiator.
In analyzing the waiver of a hearing in Overmyer, the Supreme
Court focused its attention on the bargaining process between the
parties, and it analyzed this process in terms similar to those established
for administrative hearings in Goldberg. The Overmyer Court noted
that the two parties, being of equivalent size and economic power, had
an opportunity to present their respective positions.93 It emphasized
that there had been extensive, face-to-face negotiations in which all
issues, including the cognovit clause, were open for discussion. 94 Final-
ly, the Court specifically indicated that Overmyer had been represented
also had the effect of waiving the right to receive notice. For this reason, Szukhent is
often cited to support the proposition that constitutional rights may in fact be waived.
E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-36, 236 n.17 (1973); D.H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co., 405 U.s. 174, 185 (1972).
90. 375 U.S. at 316, 318. Justices Black and Brennan, dissenting separately, each em-
phasized the adhesive nature of the waiver term involved. Id. at 332-33 (Black, J., dis-
senting); id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that the actual
events were not the equivalent of the rights that had been waived, primarily because the
waiver of notice also operated as a forum selection clause, which denied Szukhent the
right to have a trial near his home. Id. at 324-26. The right to a convenient trial could
be waived, Justice Black agreed, but the particular provision in this case was adhesive
and thus ineffective. Id. at 326-27. In other words, his argument is that the result of the
waiver was not the functional equivalent of the rights a court would have provided, and
thus the process by which the waiver was secured must be scrutinized. This is essentially
the same mode of analysis as is proposed in this Note.
91. 405 U.S. at 186-87. In fact, as soon as Overmyer ceased making payments, it
initiated an action in federal court to stay all proceedings under the cognovit. Id. at 181.
92. 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976)
(reaffirming Goldberg, although altering its specific requirements regarding oral hearings
for certain types of administrative decisions).
93. 405 U.S. at 186.
94. Id. at 182-83, 186.
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by counsel when the cognovit was included in the contract.9 5
In contrast to the agreements in Szukhent and Overmyer, the con-
tractual waiver provision in Fuentes was found to be defective, mainly
because the provision itself was unclear and thereby failed to pro-
vide the functional equivalent of notice.96 Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that even if the provision had been clear, it still would have
been ineffective, because of the inequality of bargaining power between
the parties and the resultant lack of actual bargaining.97
Thus the Supreme Court cases involving contractual waivers suggest
that judicial notice can be waived only if unofficial notice of an
equivalent nature is provided and that a hearing can be waived only if
its equivalent is supplied by the private interaction between the
parties.98
B. Functional Equivalents for Commercial Rights
Remedial waivers that alter only specific aspects of the ultimate
remedy, thus not rising to constitutional dimensions, fall into two
main categories: either they withdraw a potential breach from con-
sideration in any hearing that might ultimately take place, or they
establish a remedy for a specific breach in advance of any hearing. The
waivers that withdraw a potential breach from judicial consideration
are usually warranty disclaimers. These disclaimers waive the right to
have a court determine whether a certain kind of breach has actually
95. Id. at 183. See North Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Shultz, No. 74-4195-03-6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1977) (denying petition to open cognovit judgment). The Pennsylvania
court began by citing Overmyer for the proposition that "if the waiver of procedural rights
entailed in signing a confession note is to be valid, it must be intelligent and voluntary."
Id. at 3. It then rejected the claim of the makers of the note that they had not understood
the cognovit. Apparently dissatisfied with the adequacy of the "intelligent and voluntary"
rule in answering a claim that the cognovit constituted a denial of due process, the court
ivent on to specify the various procedural opportunities available to the note makers-
e.g., the petition to open judgment or a stay of execution. Id. at 6. The analysis, in effect,
was that these procedural opportunities were the functional equivalent of the rights that
had been waived.
96. 407 U.S. at 95.
97. Id. at 94-95.
98. The third major element of due process, in addition to notice and a hearing, is an
impartial decisionmaker. There are no Supreme Court cases dealing directly with the
waiver of one's due process right to a neutral decisionmaker, but closely related issues
have been raised in several other contexts. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972) (clause providing that disputes arising from overseas towing contract were
to be adjudicated in London High Court of Justice is valid because that court is fully
competent forum); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968) (arbitration pursuant to contractual provision invalid because supposedly neutral
third member of panel had pecuniary relationship with one party). In effect, both deci-
sions turned on whether the substitute decisionmaking body (the London Court or the
arbitration panel) was the functional equivalent of the decisionmaker who would have
decided the case had there been no contrary provision in the contract.
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occurred; in effect, they represent the waiver of notice and a hearing
on that particular issue. To determine whether or not such a waiver
will be permitted, courts scrutinize the objective characteristics of the
waiver provision and the process by which the waiver has been secured;
there must be some indication that the functional equivalents of notice
and a hearing have been provided for in the interaction between the
parties.""
The equivalent of judicial notice is the requirement of clarity and
conspicuousness. A conspicuous provision informs the parties, partic-
ularly the one who stands to lose something, of precisely what is at
stake, thereby preventing him from being deprived of his rights with-
out a chance to contest the substance of the issue.100 The equivalent of
a judicial hearing is provided, once again, by bargaining.' 0 ' The course
of bargaining that courts will accept as validating a waiver bears a close
resemblance to the due process concept of a hearing. First, there must
be an opportunity to present one's own position. This generally requires
a process of negotiation, whether it be oral or written. 10 2 Second, there
must be an opportunity to have an effect.' 03 In a bargaining situation,
the opportunity to have an effect is at times frustrated by a gross dis-
parity in bargaining power, combined with overreaching practices.
When that occurs, courts will often void a waiver term by reasoning
that the term was obtained by oppressive means and thus is uncon-
scionable.104
The third criterion is the right to be represented by counsel. Courts
99. See pp. 1065-66, 1071-72 supra.
100. See id.
101. Notice, of course, is the necessary antecedent of bargaining; unless the person is
aware that a particular action has been taken, he has no way to contest it. But notice by
itself is of no value unless the possibility exists for the person to make an appearance and
obtain some advantage.
102. The point is particularly clear in those cases where other terms were negotiated
but the remedial waiver was added by one party without any specific mention being made
of it. See Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 861, 454 S.W.2d
307, 309 (1970) (agreement negotiated by telephone takes precedence over disclaimer
printed on shipping tag); Mobile Hous., Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611, 615 (rex. Ct. App.
1973) (agreement negotiated with express warranty of conformity to model display takes
precedence over "as is" clause in contract).
103. Although this does not have a precise parallel in the due process requirements
specified in Goldberg, it is derived from the same underlying principle as the right of
cross-examination. The idea is that the other party must present himself and take his
chances with being discredited or defeated.
104. E.g., Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d
352, 353-54 (1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1972)
(waiver term is unfair for lessor who cannot bargain, as it would be for consumer);
Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 140-41, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393-94 (Civ.
Ct. 1969) (conspicuous waiver term is unfair and thus void when obtained by use of un-
equal bargaining power).
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often cite the fact that a particular contract was negotiated by lawyers,
or by experienced businessmen, as a reason for enforcing waiver
terms.105 Although the presence of a lawyer is not a necessary precondi-
tion to the valid waiver of remedial rights, it does suggest that informed
bargaining has taken place. On the other hand, when the party who
waived his rights is uneducated or does not speak English and the con-
tract is particularly complex, courts tend to conclude that there was no
real bargaining. Such contracts are frequently declared unconscion-
able. 06
The other major type of waiver in sales contracts limits the remedy
for a specific breach in advance of any hearing. Liquidated damage
clauses and damage limitations are the principal examples. Clauses
such as these eliminate the parties' rights to have a court determine the
consequences of the breach-in the typical case, to determine the
amount of damages to be awarded. They thus represent the waiver of
the right to an impartial decisionmaker on that issue. In determining
105. E.g., Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir.
1974) (contract negotiated by commercial lawyer and experienced engineer); Country
Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394, 1397 (6th Cir. 1970) (party who
waived his rights was a lawyer).
106. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(buyer's lack of education and low income were factors in deciding that contract was un-
conscionable); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289
(Civ. Ct. 1975) (buyer did not speak English and could not understand contract provisions).
The distinction between negotiated and unnegotiated contracts frequently parallels the
distinction between mercantile and consumer transactions. Courts and commentators have
noted that consumers are frequently presented with standard form contracts by salesman
who have neither the desire nor the authority to alter any of the terms. See, e.g., Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-90, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960); Slawson, supra
note 75, at 552-53. The consumer-merchant distinction has frequently served as a basis for
legislation, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975); U.C.C. § 2-719(3); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 106,
§ 2-316A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976), as well as court decisions, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Baker v. Seattle, 79
Wash. 2d 198, 199-200, 484 P.2d 405, 406 (1971).
Although the distinction is a useful one, it can be overdrawn. Contracts between
merchants often contain unnegotiated waiver terms that will be voided by courts. See
Chemetron Corp. v. MeLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 250-51 (N.D. Il1. 1974), afj'd
on other grounds, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash.
2d 256, 261, 544 P.2d 20, 24 (1974). Consumer contracts, on the other hand, are often
bargained for, either by comparison shopping, when small items are involved, or by
negotiation, when the item is a large one, like a car. In fact, remedial waivers are viewed
by courts as particularly objectionable when they are added to a contract whose other
terms were specifically negotiated. See note 102 supra (citing cases). Although the con-
sumer-merchant distinction can be a useful one, bargaining is a more exact criterion for
determining whether a contract will be considered acceptable by a court. As the Supreme
Court said in discussing procedurally based protections against prejudgment garnish-
ment, "[i]t may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely
suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts, but the probability of
irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that some procedures are
necessary to guard against the risk of initial error." North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975).
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whether such a waiver is permissiblc, courts generally scrutinize the
results reached. The waiver tends to be accepted if it provides the
functional equivalent of the result the court itself would reach in those
same circumstances. 10
One problem with this result-oriented policy is that the contractually
limited remedy, even if apparently acceptable, is not always the precise
equivalent of a judicial determination, since the opportunity for addi-
tional compensation may be lost.10s Courts often turn, therefore, to an
analysis of the process by which the waiver was secured. When the
remedy is acceptable but still deprives one party of important rights,
courts will usually demand that the waiver of these rights be secured by
a fair process-one that provides the functional equivalent of the pro-
cess a court would use when excluding consequential damages or direct
damages of certain types. It is for this reason that the requirements of
conspicuousness and bargaining, which are characteristic of warranty
disclaimer cases, are often incorporated into cases involving damage
limitations. 09
III. Implications of the Functional Equivalence Principle
This Note has derived the principle of functional equivalence from
the dialogue between two lines of court decisions regarding contracts
that waive remedial rights. This principle provides a single explanation,
applicable to both constitutional and commercial law, for the actions
courts have taken when confronted with such contracts. Nevertheless,
the conscious adoption of this principle by the courts would not be
without effect. Application of the principle would clarify the standards
for contractual waiver within the areas of constitutional and com-
mercial law and would clarify the relationship between the standards
for contractual waivers in these two areas.
A. Standards for Remedial Waivers
Although the principle of functional equivalence would not lead to
a different result in the Szukhent, Overmyer, or Fuentes cases, it would
107. See pp. 1068, 1071 supra.
108. This should be of little concern where liquidated damage clauses are involved.
There, the accuracy of the prediction serves as testimony to its fairness, and all that the
complaining party has surrendered is his chance to receive a windfall verdict from the
jury. That may not be an insignificant loss, but it is not one that need trouble a court's
sense of justice. On the other hand, the exclusion of consequential damages, or of direct
damages beyond replacement or repair, may be unfair as well as significant. Where an
economic loss has been sustained, the chance to receive compensation, even if that chance
is an uncertain one, can be of considerable importance.
109. See p. 1069 & notes 64-67 supra.
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provide a coherent principle for this line of cases. A functional
equivalence analysis for constitutional waivers of remedial rights would
begin where Fuentes did, with minimal requirements of due process. 110
Instead of resting on a limited rule such as the clarity of the waiver
term, however, it would establish a comprehensive legal framework for
ensuring that the waiver is consistent with due process requirements of
fairness. The principle would allow contracting parties sufficient lee-
way to strike a demanding but fair bargain, as Frick did in the Over-
myer case. At the same time, it would prohibit overreaching practices
of the kind that the merchants in Fuentes pursued.
In the area of commercial law, the applicable standards for given
cases are normally well defined, since they are based on explicit statu-
tory provisions. The principle of functional equivalence would clarify
the foundations of these standards and consequently would resolve some
of the specific questions that have arisen. For example, courts disagree
about whether a warranty disclaimer need be conspicuous if the buyer
read and understood its terms."' The proposed principle makes clear
that the purpose of conspicuousness is to bring the disclaimer to the
buyer's attention and thus to serve as a prelude to bargaining. Where
actual bargaining over the disclaimer took place, the court can safely
assume that the buyer was aware of the disclaimer's import and that
the requirement of notice has been fulfilled. But where there was no
bargaining, an inconspicuous provision must be voided.
Another question about which courts have disagreed is whether a
damage limitation must be conspicuous. Section 2-719 does not ex-
plicitly demand this, but some courts have implied such a require-
ment."112 Under the proposed principle, if the limitation were the
product of careful negotiation between the parties and part of a con-
tract written specifically for that occasion, there would be no reason to
demand that it be conspicuous. On the other hand, if the limitation
were part of a standard form contract, it would need to be conspicuous
unless there were clear evidence of bargaining.
A third question dividing the courts is whether various waiver terms
are severable. Some courts have held that terms that appear together in
a contract-usually warranty disclaimers and damage limitations-must
be considered separately; if one is voided, the other still can stand."'3
Other courts have held that one incorrect or unconscionable attempt at
110. See p. 1063 supra.
I11. See p. 1065 & notes 43-44 supra.
112. See p. 1069 & notes 64-65 supra.
113. E.g., County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300,
1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Carter
v. Jackson, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 983, 985-86 (D.C. 1972).
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waiver taints, and thus negates, the entire effort to restructure rem-
edies." 4 The principle of functional equivalence would reduce the
significance of the severability issue by applying the same general
standards to each effort to waive remedial rights. Thus courts would not
need to rely on the concept of tainting to reach the proper result.
Aside from answering various questions raised by the specific provi-
sions governing remedial waivers, the principle of functional equiva-
lence would also serve to clarify the general doctrine of unconscion-
ability. It would focus this doctrine on the issue of remedial waivers and
help define its requirements through analogy to the more concrete
concept of due process. Thus a remedial waiver would be unconscion-
able if it prescribed a remedy whose result was not the functional
equivalent of a remedy that a court might prescribe 15 or if it elimi-
nated any rights to notice or a hearing without providing an equiva-
lent. 116
B. Relationship between Waivers of Constitutional and Commercial
Rights
Functional equivalence would provide additional clarification by
establishing a single principle from which similar standards for waivers
in constitutional and commercial law could be derived. 117 The bi-
114. E.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); Jones &
McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43-44 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
115. See note 72 supra.
116. See notes 73-74 supra.
117. The view of remedial rights that emerges from the principle of functional
equivalence is thus consistent with the developing recognition of the interdependence of
public and private law. The idea that these two areas of law are closely related figured in
the attack on substantive due process. See, e.g., Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 553, 586 (1933) (enforcement of contracts is positive action by state and therefore "a
subsidiary branch of public law"). Recently, this same idea has been the basis of argu-
nients that contractual agreements should be subject to constitutional requirements. See,
e.g., Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory and A Mythical
Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1, 22-23; Yudof, Reflections on
Private Repossession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 954, 963
(1974). Functional equivalence would acknowledge the close relationship between public
and private law in the area of contractual waivers of remedial rights. If the applicable
rules for the waiver of these rights depend on whether the particular rights in question
are constitutional or commercial, then the distinction between the two areas of law is
critical. But if the applicable rules depend on notions of fairness and the specific facts of
the transaction, the distinction becomes much less important. In its place appears a single
system, relevant to all situations. Cf. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REXV. 208 (1957) (suggesting that constitu-
tional inquiry should focus on impact of particular action on individuals, not on question
whether constitutional requirements are applicable); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action,
14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 7-8 (1961) (suggesting that inquiry should balance personal interests of
parties involved, impact of court inaction on these interests, and demands of local au-
tonomy, rather than tying to determine whether constitutional requirements are ap-
plicable).
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furcated conceptual approach employed at present serves neither the
interests of the parties nor of the courts. From the perspective of the
parties, the question whether the waiver is of constitutional or merely
commercial proportions is of little import-what is crucial to them is
whether the waiver will be enforced or voided. From the perspective of
the judge or jury, the validity of the waiver is an identifiable issue that
is best evaluated on its own terms, not by reference to a complex divi-
sion between two sets of ill-defined standards. The principle of func-
tional equivalence would focus the analysis on the nature of the waiver
itself and would generate a set of standards that is more directly related
to the practical realities of waiver cases.
The principle would also lead to a clearer conception of the nature
and extent 'of the remedial rights themselves. It suggests that the pre-
vailing notion of fair or adequate remedial rights results from the
application of due process considerations to the particular transaction
between parties.118 Although the functional equivalence principle is a
flexible one, it does require that an irreducible minimum of remedial
rights must be available to each party to a contract, as a requirement of
law, and that this minimum cannot be sold or otherwise eliminated. At
the same time, it would permit these rights to be provided in a variety
of ways, including a purely private interaction. 119 The rights are thus
universal but flexible, relatively fixed in content but largely variable in
form. Such a conception of remedial rights would permit courts to
satisfy the demands of both fairness and flexibility in judging remedial
waivers.
118. See pp. 1072-73 supra.
119. See generally Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937)
(private lawmaking is both widespread and desirable).
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